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Although there might seem to be a natural continuity and
interplay between the cognitive sciences and the social
sciences, the integration of the two has, on the whole, been
fraught with difficulties. In some areas the transition was
relatively smooth. For instance, political psychology is
now a well-recognized branch both of psychology and of
political science. In economics, things have been more
difficult, with the entrenched assumption of a perfectly
rational homo economicus, but behavioral economics is
now well recognized, and one of the founders of the field,
Daniel Kahneman, went on to win a Nobel Prize.
Social and cognitive sciences have proven more difficult
to bridge in anthropology and sociology. Most of the
efforts have been pursued—and resisted—in anthropology
(although, for sociology, see Cle´ment and Kaufmann
2011). At first, scholars attempted to import the methods of
evolutionary biology straight into the study of culture
(Dawkins 1976; Lumsden and Wilson 1981). This
prompted a severe backlash from anthropologists and other
social scientists. Later, and partly as a result of the for-
mation of the field of evolutionary psychology, methods
and results from cognitive science were brought to bear on
the topic of cultural evolution.
One of the most influential attempts to understand cul-
tural phenomena using these new tools is the Gene-Culture
Coevolution (or Dual Inheritance Theory) model of Boyd
and Richerson (1985). To understand the spread of cultural
elements, this framework chiefly relies on simple social
psychological biases, such as the tendency to preferentially
imitate the behaviors of the majority, or of the most
prestigious individuals. The framework also incorporates
other psychological mechanisms under the umbrella of
content biases: these mechanisms only affect the trans-
mission of particular cultural contents, from representa-
tions of faces to knowledge about poisonous plants.
However, in order to build tractable models, the Gene
Culture Coevolution framework has mostly investigated
the effects of simple social biases and has stayed away
from the reliance on more complex cognitive mechanisms.
The framework of the epidemiology of representation,
developed by Sperber (1996; Claidie`re and Sperber 2007),
may offer a more promising perspective to integrate a rich
view of psychology and culture. This model starts from the
observation that most cultural transmission is extremely
noisy. For instance, when someone says something, the
interlocutor might not understand her exact meaning, he is
likely to forget some of what was said, and to transform the
content again in the process of retelling. As a result, the
elements that are most likely to become widespread, or to
survive across generations, are not only those that best
withstand noisy transmission, but also those towards which
noisy transmission converges. Psychological mechanisms
are one of the factors that influence which element is more
likely to be robust enough, or attractive enough, to become
widespread. For instance, a recent study has argued that the
strong psychological reaction elicited by direct eye-gaze
helps explain why the art of portraiture tends to converge
on subjects that gaze right at the viewer (Morin 2013).
On the whole, cognitively informed approaches to cul-
ture have had a limited impact on mainstream cultural
anthropology, in large part, it seems, because of funda-
mental disagreements about methods or even ontology. In
psychology, by contrast, there is much less resistance to the
idea that culture ought to be taken into account. For
instance, in 2010 Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan
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published an article pointing out that most of experimental
psychology has focused almost exclusively on WEIRD
people (people who live in Western Educated Industralized
Rich Democratic countries; Henrich et al. 2010). These
WEIRD people constitute only 12 % of the world popu-
lation, yet 96 % of psychology experiments target them.
This is especially problematic since WEIRD people appear
to be, in many cases, a very unrepresentative sample—for
instance, they belong to the most individualistic cultures
studied. The article is widely quoted, on the whole
approvingly, suggesting that many experimental psychol-
ogists share the authors’ concern for lack of cross-cultural
controls. However, it remains to be seen whether this will
change current practices.
Even when psychologists pay attention to culture, it is
most of the time in the form of straightforward cross-cul-
tural studies. These studies compare the performance of
samples from two populations (more often than not
‘Easterners’—‘EEIR(D)’ people—and ‘Westerners’) on a
standard psychological task. The issue in many cases is that
a great many variables are confounded, so that pointing out
the causally relevant factors at play can be daunting. For
instance, Masuda and Nisbett (2001) showed across several
experiments that Easterners tend to pay more attention to
contextual information, and Westerners more to focal
information in their perception of visual scenes. These
differences were interpreted chiefly in terms of high-level
cultural constructs such as ‘‘Asians’ relatively greater
interdependence or concern with the social world’’ (Mi-
yamoto et al. 2006, p. 113). However, later experiments by
the same group revealed that the immediate visual envi-
ronment plays a major role in these differences. American
participants shown pictures of Japanese streets—cluttered
with various objects—paid more attention to the context
(than a control group), while Japanese participants shown
pictures of American streets—relatively barren—paid more
attention to focal objects (than a control group; Miyamoto
et al. 2006). Such conflicting patterns of cultural differ-
ences are not uncommon, and have led some researchers to
suggest that we may be better served by using narrower and
more precisely defined constructs, such as specific religious
beliefs (Colzato et al. 2010).
What should be clear from this very short overview is
that much works remains to be done at the intersection of
psychology and culture. Indeed, one might hope that a
substantial part of anthropology and of psychology (at least
when it comes to high level cognition) becomes devoted to
the numerous questions raised by this intersection. The
present issue offers a broad panorama of the type of study
that can be done mixing psychology and culture, beyond
standard cross-cultural psychological studies.
Harris and Lane describe a series of studies testing very
young children’s ability to evaluate testimony. This
research stems from a larger project investigating the way
older children (often preschoolers) evaluate testimony, a
project born of the observation that much of children’s
knowledge comes from others rather than from personal
observation. While this is true of many non-cultural beliefs
(who their uncle is, say), it is even truer (by definition) of
cultural beliefs and knowledge, from folktales to science.
The research reviewed by Harris and Lane reveals for
instance that 14-month-olds look for, and take into account
their mothers’ expressions when deciding whether to
approach an apparently deep cliff or not (Sorce et al. 1985).
In this case the mother’s influence on her child is unlikely
to have been cultural—in a naturalistic situation, she would
presumably have used a perceptual assessment of the
danger—or to become cultural—the child is not particu-
larly likely to pass on the mother’s assessment to other
people. However, it is easy to imagine cases in which the
same process is deeply cultural. For instance, a distrust of
electric sockets could be passed on in this way without
anyone having to learn firsthand of their danger.
Other studies with equally young children also highlight
another factor that could have critical effects for the spread
of culture: epistemic vigilance. Like older children and
adults, very young children do not blindly accept com-
municated information: they are epistemically vigilant
(Sperber et al. 2010). Tamis-LeMonda et al. (2008) repli-
cated and extended the results above by showing that while
18-month-olds were taking their mother’s advice into
account when deciding whether or not to engage on a
slope, they only did so when the slope was ‘borderline,’
and not when it was either clearly safe or clearly risky.
These results show that children’s intuitions shape the
social information they take in. To the extent that culture
can spread through these channels, such restrictions can
play an important role on what is more likely to become
cultural. For instance, children’s lack of intuition that
electric sockets are dangerous could slow the spread of the
cultural practice of avoiding these sockets.
As Harris and Lane, Kaufmann and Cle´ment review and
offer a new interpretation of psychological research rele-
vant to the explanation of cultural phenomena: the study of
naı¨ve sociology. Hirschfeld suggested that as humans are
endowed with mechanisms to understand the physical
world (naı¨ve physics) or other people’s minds (naı¨ve psy-
chology), they are also equipped with mechanisms to
understand the dynamic at play between human groups
(Hirschfeld, 1995). In their article, Kaufmann and Cle´ment
defend a different view of naı¨ve sociology, one that is not
based on individuals (who belongs to what group), but on
relations (who is friends with whom, etc.). Moreover, they
claim that our naı¨ve understanding of relations is intrinsi-
cally deontic: we cannot help but judge how others act with
the various individuals they are related to.
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On this basis, Kaufmann and Cle´ment show how these
intuitions about relations shape culture. They note for
instance the relative ease with which anthropologists dis-
covering cultures very different from their own can rec-
ognize various forms of relations, from parent-children to
market transactions. Even when they assume very com-
plex, culturally specific forms, most relationships—such as
the relationship between the members of a given nation—
can be understood as being related to a basic form of
interaction, one that any human could recognize. Kauf-
mann and Cle´ment also stress that the shaping of culture by
psychology is not unidirectional. While the fundamental
relations can be understood by all humans, they are not all
equally salient. For instance, Japanese culture makes the
relation of subordination more salient than American
culture.
Beyond the relevance of psychology for the study of
culture, Kaufmann and Cle´ment defend the more general
relevance of cognitive science for the social sciences. One
must hope that the new ways of construing naı¨ve sociology
developed in the article will help cognitive and social
scientists see the mutual relevance of their disciplines.
Pignocchi’s analysis of the role of ‘‘history and inten-
tions in the experience of artworks’’ also plays on the back
and forth between psychology and culture. Contrary to
most past attempts to recruit cognitive science in order to
explain the visual arts, Pignocchi does not rely on low-
level universal mechanisms; he sides instead with the art
historians who noted that ‘‘the way we evaluate an artwork
always depends on what we know about its context of
production,’’ so that low-level mechanisms play at most a
peripheral role, depending on how their output is inter-
preted. However, the ‘‘always’’ in the previous sentence
suggests that universal mechanisms are at play; not low-
level perceptual mechanisms, but high-level cognitive
mechanisms that enable the viewer to integrate contextual
information into her appreciation of a work of art.
It is these high-level mechanisms that Pignocchi is
interested in. His approach is original in claiming a central,
necessary role for the attribution of intentions to the artist,
and in particular the attribution of a wide range of inten-
tions (by contrast with only conscious intentions). Pig-
nocchi relies on work in cognitive science showing the
often neglected role played by intention attribution to our
understanding of artifacts, communication, and simple
motor behavior. For instance, understanding the simplest
utterance involves several layers of attribution of inten-
tions. Such high-level cognitive mechanisms as the attri-
bution of intentions naturally take contextual information
into account—without this ability, it would be impossible
to understand ostensive communication for instance. In the
case at hand, contextual information is often of a historical
nature: e.g., beliefs about what school of painting the artist
belonged to. As a result, if culturally acquired information
shapes our perception of works of art, this is due to uni-
versal cognitive mechanisms that are precisely aimed at
taking such contextual information into account.
Pignocchi’s article illustrates the barrenness of opposing
the perspective of the social sciences and of the cognitive
sciences. When art historians attempt to dismiss cognitive
science by pointing out the role of contextual information
in our appreciation of works of art, they are in fact pointing
out the role of specific cognitive processes: those that allow
us to take contextual information into account (one of the
greatest computational feats). A better understanding of
these mechanisms could lead to a better understanding of
the way we interpret works of art—and vice versa.
As noted above, an important framework bridging psy-
chology and culture is that of Gene-Culture Coevolution. In
this framework, the main forces that allow culture to spread
and stabilize are social biases that are mostly independent
of the content of the information transmitted: the prestige
bias and the conformity bias. By contrast, the Sperberian
approach stresses the importance of content and how a
variety of psychological mechanisms can shape cultural
evolution. This latter approach has been successfully
applied to the study of religious beliefs. In particular,
Boyer (2001) has persuasively argued that widespread
religious beliefs tend to be minimally counter-intuitive:
they mostly fit the template of a core cognitive mechanism
(such as naı¨ve psychology), which makes them easy to
understand, but they deviate in one crucial way, making
them more interesting and memorable. By contrast, theo-
logical beliefs are generally seen to rely more on the for-
mer type of mechanisms: ‘blind’ social heuristics that are
presumably able to allow the spread of even counter-intu-
itive beliefs such as that of an omniscient and omnipotent
deity.
In her article, De Cruz argues that, on the contrary, an
approach based on a fine-grained understanding of various
psychological mechanisms is also necessary to make sense
of counter-intuitive theological beliefs. In particular De
Cruz suggests that mechanisms of epistemic vigilance,
such as reasoning and coherence checking, exert an
important role on the spread of counter-intuitive theologi-
cal beliefs. For a counter-intuitive theological belief to
spread, it has to convince others, others who will typically
be experts in the area and who seek to maintain a high level
of internal coherence in their beliefs. Indeed, we find in
theology some extremely sophisticated arguments, such as
Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God.
As a result, some deviations from current beliefs—those
that satisfy the constraints of epistemic vigilance mecha-
nisms—are more likely to spread than others.
These processes can lead to the spread of increasingly
counter-intuitive beliefs in a stepwise fashion. Given a set
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of theological beliefs held at a given time, an effort to
improve on the internal coherence of the set can make it
more likely to spread—at least among the elite circles that
carefully scrutinize arguments—even if some individual
beliefs are less intuitive. This could explain how deeply
counter-intuitive beliefs (such as those mentioned above,
omniscience and omnipotence) could emerge and prove
culturally successful, at least in the rarefied sphere of
sophisticated theology.
The last two contributions to this collection take as their
starting point a specific cognitive mechanism and confront
it to the realities and complexities of culture. In both cases,
the cognitive mechanism is reasoning, and, more particu-
larly, reasoning viewed as an argumentative ability. Mer-
cier and Sperber (2011) relied on the experimental
psychology literature to defend the view (akin to the prior
suggestions of, e.g., Billig 1996; Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 1958) that the function of human reasoning is pri-
marily argumentative: to convince others through argu-
ments, and to examine others’ arguments so as to only be
convinced when one ought to be.
While such an argumentative theory of reasoning might
be interpreted as a justification for blatantly biased, barren
argumentation, Morin urges his reader to not jump to
conclusions. He rightfully notes that for such a theory to be
plausible, people have to sometimes change their mind
when confronted with good arguments—otherwise argu-
mentation would be pointless. Moreover, Morin points out
that the effects of reasoning depend on the goals of the
reasoner—a lawyer and a scientist will not make the same
use of it, for instance. In other words, the outcome of
reasoning depends on complex interactions with other
psychological mechanisms. While in some experimental
contexts, it is possible to reduce these ‘interferences’ to a
minimum—or at least to keep them constant—in real life
they often play an overwhelming role, creating cautious
reasoners eager to take in others’ arguments or sophists
bent on persuading by any means available. In order to be
useful to social scientists, specifications of cognitive
mechanisms have to be careful to describe not only their
individual functioning, but also the ways in which they
interact (the main ways at least, as the possibilities are
limitless).
Mercier and Heintz confront the argumentative theory
of reasoning with a specific cultural context: science. As
noted by Morin (following, e.g., Shapin 1991), in the West
at least the popular image of a scientist is that of a brain
detached not only from lowly material needs, but also from
other people. In popular imagination, the scientist under-
stands the world from the confines of his brilliant, objec-
tive, solitary mind.
This does not fit well with the argumentative theory of
reasoning, which predicts that solitary reasoning, plagued
by the myside bias, should often lead to poor outcomes,
while group discussion should by contrast let the best
arguments carry the day and allow the best ideas to spread
and develop.
However, even a cursory examination, as the one offered
here, of the historical, sociological, ethnographic and psy-
chological evidence militates against the popular view of
science. Like everyone else, scientists are biased, and they
rely hugely on argumentation for their discoveries.
Thus a specific cultural institution—in this case sci-
ence—can be used to evaluate the robustness of psycho-
logical theories. Indeed, such cases provide evidence that
would be unobtainable in a laboratory: how could one
motivate participants to think about specific problems for
so long and with such intensity?
Mercier and Heintz’ review also revealed that, even if
scientists rely on the same reasoning abilities as everyone
else, the specific context in which they make use of these
abilities exerts a strong influence on the final outcomes. In
Morin’s terms, scientific institutions reward some virtues
of ingenuity, such as thoroughness, enabling solitary rea-
soning about science to yield better outcomes than solitary
reasoning about less constrained domains. Although this
path is not pursued here, one can hope that a better
understanding of reasoning—along with other cognitive
mechanisms—will yield a better understanding of science
in all its cultural complexity.
Even though they do not represent the full range of
possibilities, by far, the articles of this special issue already
demonstrate the wide range of research that can be carried
out at the intersection of psychology and culture, and
hopefully will stimulate further research in this most
promising direction.
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